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Derek Parfit’s Contributions to Philosophy 
Wlodek Rabinowicz 
In 2014, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded Derek Parfit the Rolf Schock Prize in 
Logic and Philosophy. In its motivation, the Academy stressed Parfit’s ground-breaking 
contributions to theory of personal identity, population ethics and analysis of the structure of 
moral theories.  
The list of philosophers and logicians who have received the Rolf Schock Prize is as yet 
relatively short. It starts with Willard v. Quine (1993) and continues with Michael Dummett 
(1995), Dana Scott (1997), John Rawls (1999), Saul Kripke (2001), Solomon Feferman (2003); 
Jaakko Hintikka (2005), Thomas Nagel (2008), Hilary Putnam (2011) and Parfit (2014). The 
prize was originally awarded every second year, but since 2005 it is given every third year. There 
are also Rolf Schock prizes in Mathematics, Music, and Visual Arts. 
This special issue of Theoria is devoted to Derek Parfit’s contributions to philosophy. It contains 
the talk on population ethics he gave at the prize symposium in Stockholm in October 2014. In 
addition, it includes papers written by the four other contributors to the symposium: Gustaf 
Arrhenius, Ruth Chang, Ingmar Persson and Larry Temkin.  
Derek Parfit was born 1942 in China, where his parents – both of whom were physicians – gave 
courses in preventive medicine at mission-run hospitals. He went to Eton and then, 1961, started 
reading history at Balliol College in Oxford. 1965-66 he went on to Columbia and Harvard as a 
Harkness Fellow. It was then that he became fascinated by philosophy. Upon his return to Oxford 
he won a seven-year Prize Fellowship at All Souls College. He remained at the same college even 
thereafter, as research fellow; indeed, he spent his entire academic career at All Souls, where he 
presently (since 2010) is Emeritus Senior Research Fellow. He has been visiting professor at 
several North-American universities: Harvard, NYU, and Rutgers. Some of these trans-Atlantic 
assignments he retained even after retirement from Oxford. He is a member of British Academy 
and of American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
Parfit’s most famous and influential work, Reasons and Persons, was published 1984. In its 
importance for the development of moral philosophy it is often compared with Henry Sidgwick’s 
great nineteenth century classic The Methods of Ethics. It opened new and exciting vistas and 
radically changed the landscape in which moral philosophy was pursued. In 2011, Parfit 
published his second magnum opus, On What Matters, in two volumes comprising altogether 
nearly 1400 pages. Even this book has been compared with Sidgwick’s Methods. Its second 
volume includes other philosophers’ objections to the theory presented in the first volume, 
together with Parfit’s replies. A third volume is under way, with further replies, this time to the 
objections included in a forthcoming collection Does Anything Really Matter?, edited by Peter 
Singer. 
Apart from these two monumental works, Parfit published a large number of important papers, 
among which one should mention “Personal Identity” (1971), “Is Common-Sense Morality Self-
Defeating?” (1979), “Future Generations: Further Problems” (1982), “Rationality and Time” 
(1983), “The Unimportance of Identity” (1995), “Equality and Priority” (1997), “Reasons and 
Motivation” (1997), “Rationality and Reasons” (2001), “Justifiability to Each Person” (2003), 
“Overpopulation and The Quality of Life” (2004), “What We Could Rationally Will” (2004), 
“Normativity” (2006), “Another Defence of the Priority View” (2012). Some of the papers have 
been incorporated in his books; some further develop topics from Reasons and Persons; while 
others take up new subjects. 
With the publication of Reasons and Persons in the mid-1980s, Derek Parfit set the direction for 
the mainstream of moral theory. The book's impact was momentous, not only due to the ideas it 
put forward, but also due to its philosophical style, with a frequent usage of hypothetical 
examples appealing to the reader's moral intuitions. Reasons and Persons consists of four parts. 
In the first part, ”Self-Defeating Theories”, the focus is on structural analysis of normative 
theories. Three such theories are subjected to closer investigation: (i) self-interest theory, which 
prescribes that one maximizes the satisfaction of one’s own interests over time, (ii) 
consequentialism, which prescribes the realization of the best outcome, whether or not that 
outcome is best for oneself, and (iii) common-sense morality, according to which we have special 
obligations towards particular persons: towards our near and dear.  
Parfit considers under what conditions compliance with a normative theory or, alternatively, 
conscious efforts to comply may defeat the very objectives the theory explicitly or implicitly puts 
forward. In the former case, when defeat is caused by compliance, the normative theory is 
directly self-defeating, while in the latter case, when defeat is caused by the efforts to comply,  
the defeat is indirect. Parfit argues that consequentialism is indirectly self-defeating. Impartial 
consequentialists are bad at maintaining close relationships with their family and friends. A 
sustained pursuit of the best outcome might therefore well lead to a loss of important values that 
essentially depend on personal relations. This is troublesome but need not show that 
consequentialism is an incorrect theory. Instead, the conclusion might be that we should abstain, 
on purely consequentialist grounds, from wholeheartedly embracing consequentialism.  
On the other hand, self-interest theory and common-sense morality are directly self-defeating, not 
individually but collectively. If we all obey the prescriptions of such a theory, we fail to realize 
the objectives it gives to each of us. Common-sense morality requires a particular consideration 
for our nearest and dearest; however, if practised by everyone, it may well lead to an outcome 
that will be suboptimal for everyone concerned: for each of us, the interests of our near and dear 
will be less well satisfied than it could be otherwise, in the absence of such special consideration. 
The same goes for self-interest theory which prescribes exclusive attention to our self-interest: as 
is well-known, universal pursuit of self-interest gives rise to prisoners’ dilemmas.  
That common-sense morality is collectively directly self-defeating shows, according to Parfit that 
this theory cannot be correct: it must be revised. The same does not, however, apply to self-
interest theory. The latter is meant to codify individual rationality. As it does not purport to be a 
moral code – a code for the collective – it cannot be disqualified just because it is collectively 
self-defeating. If it is to be criticised, this has to be done in another way.  
In the second part of the book, “Rationality and Time”, Parfit argues that self-interest theory is 
inconsistent in its treatment of persons and times: it privileges the self but it has no bias towards 
the present and the near future. It favours the self’s preferences as compared with preferences of 
others, but it gives the same weight to preferences one holds at different times – in the present, in 
the near future, and in the more distant future. This inconsistency is unacceptable according to 
Parfit: Either we should be partial in both the temporal and the personal dimension, which would 
give us what he calls the Present-Aim Theory, or we should be partial in none, which is the 
solution he himself adopts. He also points out that self-interest theory is not fully consistent in its 
time-impartiality: As standardly formulated, self-interest theory does not give weight to the 
preferences held in the past. But this only makes it even more problematic.  
Parfit fully realizes, of course, that orientation towards the present and the future and relative 
disregard for the past are quite fundamental to our human condition. Think only of all those 
situations in which we have wished to have some onerous tasks or unpleasant experience already 
behind us, rather than still awaiting us in the future. That our concerns are future-directed in this 
way is of course perfectly understandable and amenable to an evolutionary explanation given that 
the past lies outside our causal control. An explanation can also be given to our bias towards the 
near future as opposed to the more distant one. Still, Parfit contrasts our ordinary time-partial 
attitude with the time-neutral ’philosophical’ perspective, to which he himself is drawn. The 
correct way to look upon temporally located events is to view them impartially – ”sub specie 
aeternitatis”. 
The third part of the book, ”Personal Identity”, is devoted to analysis of personal identity over 
time. As most other people, I am especially concerned about what’s going to happen to myself in 
the future. But such an attitude presupposes that personal identity over time is something that 
matters – a presupposition that Parfit endeavours to undermine. An important premise in his 
argument is that there is no irreducible I – no metaphysical substance that survives over time. The 
second step is a suggestion that what matters to me is that there will exist a person in the future 
that will have an appropriate relation to my present self – a psychological relation of continuity 
and similarity. This relation, however, cannot be equated with personal identity. In some science-
fiction scenarios there might simultaneously exist several future persons that are related to me in 
this way: think for example of a division of the brain in two halves, each of which is later 
transplanted into a body of its own. None of these future individuals will then be able to claim 
identity with me now. If any of them is identical with me, then so are all of them, which is 
impossible given that they are distinct from each other. However, I would still have a special 
concern for their wellbeing. It follows, therefore, that it is not personal identity that matters, after 
all. If we now put science-fiction scenarios aside, it is important to point out that what matters – 
psychological relations of continuity and similarity – might well connect me to a multiplicity of 
simultaneously existing future persons, although this relationship will normally vary in degree. I 
therefore have reason to revise my self-centered attitudes when I realize that even other persons 
in the future will be psychologically related to me to a larger or smaller degree. Parfit appears to 
think that this fact can provide a reason to accept impartiality in our concern for future persons 
(rather than a reason to embrace some form of graded partiality). I don’t quite see, however, how 
this last step follows. 
The fourth part of the book, ”Future Generations”, has probably been the most discussed. In the 
center of the discussion stands Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem. When we ask whether future 
people will be benefited or harmed by our actions, the issue gets considerably complicated when 
we realize that the alternative actions that we have to choose between, for example the alternative 
ways to deal with the threat of global warming, will most certainly influence which people will 
exist in the future. What we do will directly or indirectly affect people’s behaviour in many 
different ways and thus will also affect the time at which they will conceive their children. 
Therefore, depending on which action we choose, it will be different children that are going to be 
born. If the choice has far-reaching consequences, then in the long run there won’t be anyone 
who would exist if we made another choice instead. For no one it will be the case that his or her 
life would have been better (or worse) if we acted differently. So how can we say that these 
future people will be harmed or benefited by our present actions? A conclusion that lies close at 
hand is that the Non-Identity Problem again suggests that the normative importance of personal 
identity should be denied, though in this case it is not identity over time but across possible 
worlds. 
But the difficulties for population ethics, i.e. ethical theory that deals with future generations, do 
not stop here. Whether or not personal identity across possible scenarios is normatively relevant, 
Parfit shows that a number of seemingly very plausible ethical principles leads to what he has 
called the Repugnant Conclusion: The principles in question imply that a future world populated 
by people with a very high level of wellbeing is worse or at least not better than a possible world 
whose inhabitants lead lives that are barely worth living, provided only that that the latter are 
sufficiently more numerous than the former. On one version of this derivation, the principles 
involved are just the following three: (i) the transitivity of betterness, (ii) the mere addition 
principle according to which adding lives worth living while at the same time keeping the 
wellbeing of already existing persons unchanged or perhaps even raising it a bit does not make 
the world worse, and (iii) a weak principle of equality according to which it is an improvement if 
we can equalize the wellbeing of the existing people, assuming that we do not change their 
number or decrease the wellbeing average. We need to give up some of these principles if we 
want to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, but which principles in that case? And what principles 
should they be replaced with? How should a complete population ethics look like if it is not going 
to imply any ludicrous conclusions? Is there any such ethics at all? Those are some of the 
questions that Parfit has left unanswered. It is not surprising that his book gave rise to such an 
intense discussion. 
The second book, On What Matters, will here be described in a very cursory way. It has two main 
themes. The first is an attempt to achieve consensus among moral philosophers coming from 
different ethical points of departure. Parfit endeavours to show that Kantian ethics, 
contractualism and rule consequentialism all converge towards the same normative standpoint, 
provided that each of these views is interpreted and re-interpreted in a satisfactory way. 
Interpretation invites modification and modifications, if reasonable, lead to convergence. To use 
his metaphor, these normative theories climb the same mountain, from different sides, and thus 
can meet at the summit. They can all agree on the Triple Theory, as Parfit calls it, according to 
which, roughly, “an act is wrong just when such acts are disallowed by some principle that is 
optimific, uniquely universally willable, and not reasonably rejectable.” (Vol. I, p.413)  
The second theme concerns the notion of a normative reason. Parfit is one of a number of 
philosophers who have in recent years managed to radically re-orient discussions about 
normativity. The earlier focus on ought as the central normative concept has nowadays given way 
to a focus on the concept of a reason. What ought to be done is determined by the balance of 
reasons. The second main theme of the book is a sustained defense of objectivism about reasons. 
As part of this overall project, Parfit criticizes several competing accounts – different subjectivist, 
non-cognitivist or relativistic conceptions of reasons. He argues for the existence of objective 
truths to the effect that such-and-such facts provide or do not provide normative reasons for such-
and-such actions or attitudes. It needn’t be pointed out, I am sure, that his position on this 
fundamental issue is highly controversial.  
Reasons and Persons was a book that largely determined the direction for the mainstream of 
moral philosophy from the mid-80-ies onwards. It led to a tidal change by posing entirely new 
problems and proposing highly provocative ideas: the Non-Identity Problem, the need to re-think 
the entire project of population ethics, the normative unimportance of personal identity, etc. 
Parfit’s more recent book, On What Matters, did circulate in different manuscript versions for 
many years prior to its publication. Nevertheless, it still is a little too early to judge its influence 
on the ensuing course of philosophical discussions about the nature of morality. It should not be 
surprising therefore that the motivation for the 2014 Rolf Schock Prize focuses on Parfit’s 
seminal contributions in Reasons and Persons. 
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